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There is a growing trend to widespread privatisation of crop breeding, and there are grounds 
for expecting this trend to continue and even to accelerate. Possible consequences for 
Australian grain growers and the national interest of much greater private sector involvement 
in plant breeding are explored.  
Growing privatisation and commercialisation of plant breeding will lead to increased 
competition between plant breeders. While this increased competition has been at least partly 
driven by the potential for value creation, it also is likely to enhance value creation from plant 
breeding so long as there is adequate continuing investment in the capacity for plant breeding, 
and more particularly in productivity enhancing enabling technology.  
In the event of monopoly provision of such enabling technology, an important policy issue 
will be access to what might be termed essential plant breeding infrastructure. For any access 
regime to essential infrastructure, the core issue is to select terms and conditions for access 
that promote full and efficient competition in upstream and downstream markets (e.g. plant 
breeding) while preserving the incentive for adequate levels of investment in the ongoing 
development, maintenance, and provision of such essential infrastructure.  
A key, perhaps pivotal issue will be pricing policy and practice. Because EPBI has the public 
good characteristic of being non-rival in use, price discovery by market processes can not be 
expected to produce the desired outcome. Moreover, even if an access regime mandated that 
EPBI be made available to all plant breeders at a uniform price, the imbalance in market 
power between the monopoly provider of EPBI and plant breeders seeking access would 
almost inevitably result in both under-production of EPBI, and in under-utilisation of any 
produced EPBI due to price rationing. Such outcomes would severely undermine the 
competitive position of Australian grain growers in international markets.  
Results from the literature on what are called excludable public goods are used to analyse the 
impact on the incentive for adequate investment in EPBI under an access regime mandating 
uniform pricing.  
 
   1 
1.  Introduction  
Economic outcomes in the “plant breeding industry” are being driven by interactions between 
advances in scientific knowledge, changes in the legal framework for intellectual property 
rights, and competitive forces in the market. While extended property rights have created the 
foundation for new markets, the opportunities arising from scientific discoveries have 
provided powerful incentives for firms to enter these markets and invest in plant breeding. 
The competitive forces unleashed by these developments are likely to transform the 
production of new plant varieties.  
This potential for modern plant breeding to create value in the supply chain is one of the 
driving forces behind the increasing privatisation of plant breeding. In conjunction with an 
enhanced ability for plant breeding organisations .to appropriate a sizeable share of the 
benefits from improved varieties; it is inevitable that crop breeding in Australia faces a 
transition from a system dominated by public plant breeding programs to one in which private 
plant breeding plays a much more important role. Moreover, even if public and/or grower 
funded plant breeding programs survive for some crops , they also will be under pressure to 
operate more commercially and at least recover the costs of the breeding program (as distinct 
from costs of seed multiplication)by charging growers more for newly released varieties.  
As a result, there will be increasing commercialization of breeding programs, and much more 
widespread application of intellectual property rights to both germplasm and to breeding 
technologies. These changes are discussed in more detail below, including the underlying 
reasons and the policy issues that need to be addressed to ensure that the potential benefits to 
society are realised.  
2.  The Trend to Privatisation  
Historically most plant breeding in Australia was conducted by “public” research 
organisations that were financed mainly from government revenue. The supporting research 
in agronomy, plant pathology, entomology, biometry, plant nutrition, plant physiology, and 
other cognate disciplines also was publicly financed. Improved varieties were freely released 
to producers at nominal costs that at best only partially recovered the costs of breeding, let 
alone making any contribution to funding the cost of supporting research.  
While there has been a gradual substitution of collective industry derived funding for 
government funding for several decades, until recently plant breeding has continued to be 
conducted mainly in state government Departments of Agriculture, with selected universities 
and CSIRO also playing a role in some areas.  
There are now clear indications of a growing trend in Australia to privatisation of plant 
breeding for many crops. Many public systems are rapidly being overshadowed by private 
alternatives in which both new enabling technologies and improved cultivars are routinely 
protected by intellectual property rights.  
In this paper, the term privatised plant breeding is used to include any plant breeding program 
that is conducted on a “for profit” basis, or even on a “full cost recovery” basis. It includes 
plant breeding by profit making firms as well as other organisations that seek to finance the 
plant breeding operations by selling seed, or otherwise appropriating some of the benefits 
generated from growing improved varieties. Such appropriation methods include charging 
seed royalties, technology use fees, “end point royalties”, and “Closed Loop Marketing 
Agreements” (CLMA).    2 
Public plant breeding includes most other types of program, including publicly funded plant 
breeding conducted by universities or government agencies, or even contracted out to private 
institutions. It also includes plant breeding programs funded collectively by industry so long 
as new cultivars from the breeding program are available to all farmers, and so long as there is 
no significant charge for the intellectual capital embodied in these varieties.  
3.  Evidence for Emerging Trends  
In a number of other countries, there has been a stronger tradition of private plant breeding for 
many years. For instance, in Europe private companies played an important role in the 
development of modern plant breeding. There also has been a strong private plant breeding 
sector in the U.S. since at least the development of hybrid corn. Furthermore, as noted by 
Heisey, Srinivasan, and Thirtle (2002), it continues to expand at the expense of the public 
system:  
“Real inflation-adjusted investment in public-sector plant breeding in the U.S. rose until 
the 1980s but began to stagnate during the mid-1990s, followed by a decline. In 
contrast, from the mid- 1960s to the mid-1990s, real private-sector investment in plant 
breeding grew at a remarkable 7 percent annually. Comprising only one-sixth of the 
public-sector total in the 1960s, private-sector plant breeding surpassed public 
investment by the mid-1990s.” 
“the area of the U.S. planted to field corn is dominated by hybrids developed in the 
private sector. Private sector hybrids also dominate in the Union and in Canada.”  
The rapid privatisation of canola breeding in Canada provides a further indicator of the 
possible future for other public plant breeding programs, and has been comprehensively 
documented and analysed by Phillips (1999). The following brief overview of selected 
highlights was summarised from his recent report.  
As recently as 1982, there were only six canola cultivars actively grown in the world, and all 
were bred by public sector institutions in Canada. The plant breeding program used largely 
non-proprietary technologies, and all seeds produced and sold were in the public domain. The 
rate of development of new varieties was also relatively slow, with an average of one new 
variety every two years, and the average lifespan of a cultivar was about 10 years. 
Between 1982 and 1997, a number of new proprietary technologies replaced the publicly 
developed breeding methods and more than 125 new varieties were introduced. By 1996, 
private companies developed more than 75% of the new varieties, while public institutions 
only developed about one quarter of the seed sold in Canada.  The average active lifespan of a 
cultivar declined to about three years by 1997. 
In Australia, the situation differs from crop to crop. For some crops such as lupins, there is 
virtually no private sector involvement in plant breeding, and little evidence of any interest in 
future investment. Plant breeding for Canola is an example of a mixed system with both 
public and private plant breeders, and with a trend to more private plant breeding and fewer 
public plant breeding programs.  
Wheat breeding is heading in the same direction. Currently there are at least two private plant 
breeding firms, namely Grain Biotechnology Australia, and Longreach. The latter reportedly 
will invest $14m in wheat breeding over the next 5 years
1, and is a joint venture between 
AWB Ltd. and Syngenta which has wheat breeding programs in UK, France, US, Canada and 
NZ. This  
                                                 
1  The Australian, 9/3/2002 –   3 
At the same time, GRDC has signalled its intent to consolidate and to corporatise the wheat 
breeding programs that it supports. Specifically, GRDC will replace its support for Australia's 
eight existing and mainly state-based breeding programs with support for three new 
commercially focussed wheat breeding programs. These will be Sunprime, Australian Grain 
Technologies, and Enterprise Grains Australia, which is a joint venture between GRDC, the 
WA Department of Agriculture, NSW Agriculture and the Queensland Department of 
Primary Industries.  
4.  Reasons for Privatisation of Plant Breeding  
Plant breeding can be conceptualised as an investment that develops improved varieties with 
the potential to generate future benefits in the form of improved crop productivity, reduced 
costs of production, and/or higher returns. Potential value from improved cultivars will be 
realised only if and when farmers adopt these cultivars in their cropping systems, AND when 
consumers willingly purchase the food or other crop products in a competitive market. 
Growers will only adopt these new varieties if they provide real financial benefits that exceed 
the costs of adoption, including any additional costs of acquiring the improved variety. 
Similarly, consumers will only knowingly purchase food from these new varieties if by so 
doing they derive a net benefit in the form of enhanced attributes and/or lower prices relative 
to available alternatives.  
Arguably the most important reason for the growing trend to privatisation of plant breeding 
has been significant changes in the ability of plant breeders to appropriate at least some of the 
benefits from improved grain varieties that otherwise would be captured by growers. 
Specifically, the incentive for firms to invest in plant breeding depends on the ability to 
exclude grain growers, as well as competing plant breeders, from commercial exploitation of 
a breeder’s varieties unless they pay to do so.  
For some crops such as corn, the development of hybrid technology provided genetic copy 
protection that enabled plant breeders to capture much of the value from heterosis as well as 
other superior traits. For other crops, it has been the expanding scope of intellectual property 
rights that has enabled the capture of some of the value created by plant breeding.  
So while the application of science to plant breeding has generated much of the recent 
potential for value creation in the grain supply chain, it has been extensions to the legal 
framework for intellectual property rights that have made possible private capture of enough 
of the value created by plant breeding to provide the private sector with an incentive to invest 
more in plant breeding. The most significant of these intellectual property rights are patents 
and Plant Breeder’s Rights. In recent decades, both court decisions and legislative changes 
have expanded the scope and impact of these two types of intellectual property right 
appreciably.  
Complementing these developments in the institutional framework have been scientific 
discoveries that have led to greater potential for value creation by improvements in plant 
breeding methods. Apart from hybrid technology, other recent advances include new 
technologies that improve the efficiency of all plant breeding, including both conventional 
and transgenic plant breeding. Such techniques include double haploidy, plant regeneration 
systems, molecular based hybrid technologies, and marker assisted selection. Use of these 
techniques in conventional plant breeding is already reducing the time lags from initial 
crosses to release of new varieties. Potentially beneficial outcomes from the application of 
these technologies to plant breeding include one or more of the following:    4 
·  cheaper
2 development of improved crop varieties. 
·  faster/earlier development of improved crop varieties. 
·  development of superior
3 improved crop varieties, that are more productive, produce 
better quality grain, or both. 
In addition, there has been the more controversial development of transgenic technologies 
used to produce GMO’s. Potential beneficial outcomes from transgenic technologies include:  
·  development of improved crop cultivars with novel
4 agronomic/input traits that enable 
lower average costs of production. 
·  development of improved crop cultivars with novel quality-enhanced traits for which 
consumers are willing to pay a price premium.  
On the other side of the coin, publicly funded rural research has been under pressure for at 
least the last two decades. In part, this has been due to a growing perception that grain 
growers have been the primary beneficiaries of the traditional plant breeding programs. 
Historically these programs have been funded mainly from consolidated revenue. To some 
extent, this concern has been addressed by the relatively recent evolution of the GRDC and 
similar bodies that rely heavily on collective industry funding to support much of their 
investments, but the fact remains that a significant part of plant breeding programs is still 
publicly funded.  
Governments also now demand greater accountability at the same time that they reduce 
funding for agricultural research and extension. As a result, many “public” institutions are 
under pressure to become at least partially self-funding, and are starting to charge for selected 
goods and services. Public research institutions also seek to patent and/or commercialise 
discoveries made in the course of government funded research, or pursue opportunities to 
license technologies to the private sector. 
Public plant breeding programs have not been immune to government pressure to generate 
revenue from their activities. Like private business, their capacity to capture a high proportion 
of the net benefits of new varieties depends on: 
·  a legal basis to establish ownership of the intellectual property embodied in the variety,  
·  the capacity to exclude potential users who are not willing to pay the nominated price,  
·  the costs of monitoring and enforcing compliance,  
·  the capacity for price discrimination.  
Pricing practice by public institutions is still evolving. If they start charging significant fees at 
levels approaching full cost recovery, and exclude farmers unwilling to pay these fees from 
access to new varieties, then they cease to be public plant breeding organisations within the 
meaning of the term in this paper.  
                                                 
2  i.e. relative to varieties with equivalent characteristics to those currently being produced by conventional plant 
breeding methods. 
3 i.e. In this context, these are varieties that have superior performance to those that could be bred economically 
by conventional plant breeding methods.   
4  i.e. traits that could not have been incorporated economically into improved varieties by conventional plant 
breeding methods.   5 
Finally, agronomic practice by grain growers has become increasingly sophisticated and much 
more tactical. In particular, many growers now make decisions about which varieties to grow 
each season on the basis of the latest possible information about the climatic outlook and 
other seasonal indicators, such as soil moisture levels as well as weed and disease threats. 
Consequently they are less likely to use seed saved from the previous harvest, and more likely 
to purchase new seed of the desired variety from a seed merchant. This change in farming 
practice will increase the size of the seed market, and improve the economics of private plant 
breeding.  
5.  Value Creation and Value Capture for Enabling Technologies  
Inevitably the growing privatisation and commercialisation of plant breeding in the Australian 
grains industry will lead to increased competition between plant breeders. While the potential 
for value creation has been at least partly responsible for this increased competition, more 
competition among plant breeders also is likely to enhance value creation provided that there 
is continuing and sufficient investment in the underlying capacity for plant breeding. Of 
particular importance is continuing investment in productivity enhancing enabling 
technology.  
While adequate provision of enabling technologies is one cause for concern, efficient 
utilisation is another. As these enabling technologies are quasi public goods in the sense that 
they are non-rival in use, efficient utilisation involves the much maligned concept of the 
“level playing field”. If the institutional, policy, or legal framework confers advantages on 
some firms relative to others, competition may not generate desirable outcomes if the 
favoured firms are not the most efficient. Conversely, if all firms compete on a “level playing 
field”, then only the most efficient should survive.   
As noted above, the potential exists for new varieties to create value by lowering the cost of 
producing and delivering grain and grain products to consumers; and/or by enabling the 
production of superior grain products for which consumers are willing to pay higher prices. 
This potential for value creation will be realised when new varieties from the breeding 
program are released and adopted by grain growers, and the resulting products are purchased 
and consumed by end-users.  
However, much of this potential for value creation rests on a foundation of enabling 
technologies. Examples of long standing enabling technologies include the collection and 
conservation of germplasm, including both land-race and elite breeding lines, and results of 
pre-breeding research in such diverse fields as agronomy; biometry; entomology; quantitative 
genetics, plant pathology; plant physiology; plant quarantine; and product chemistry.  
More recently, the application of modern science, and in particular of molecular biology and 
information technology, to plant breeding has dramatically increased the potential to create 
extra value in the grain supply chain. As noted above, new plant breeding methods such as di-
haploidy, embryo rescue, and rapid breeding cycles have sped up the development of new 
varieties and reduced breeding costs. Furthermore, information and database systems together 
with molecular marker technology has enabled breeders to be much more selective and 
effective at identifying desirable traits in germplasm collections and incorporating these traits 
into elite lines, while transformation technologies have significantly expanded the range of 
traits that plant breeders can access.     6 
The rest of this paper addresses concerns about the provision and utilisation of essential 
enabling technologies for plant breeding. These key inputs provide the foundation for ongoing 
long-term variety improvement and consequent productivity gains. They also share a key 
attribute with public goods in that they are non-rival in use by plant breeders. Given this 
property, competitive provision by more than one supplier would involve wasteful duplication 
in the production of essential plant breeding infrastructure. Therefore, the first best solution 
would involve some form of cooperative behaviour to ensure adequate provision of these key 
enabling technologies by a sole producer.  
Traditionally, such inputs to plant breeding were non-proprietary, provision was publicly 
funded, and access by public plant breeding programs was both open and free of any charges. 
In return, no attempt was made to recover the costs of the breeding program (as distinct from 
costs of seed multiplication) by charging either plant breeders or growers for the intellectual 
property embodied in newly released varieties. Given that there is zero opportunity cost to the 
use of non-rival goods once produced, this institutional structure would represent a first best 
benchmark against which to assess the performance of alternative arrangements provided that 
public funding incurred no social cost.  
Nevertheless, for reasons already discussed, less rather than more public funds are likely to be 
available for investment in these enabling technologies, as well as in plant breeding per se. If 
as a result there is no compensating funding from other sources, eventually innovation in 
plant breeding methods and consequent returns to private investment in plant breeding are 
likely to stall.  
Traditionally, the main alternative source to government funding has been collectively 
financed industry bodies. For instance, in Australia the needs of the grains industry are likely 
to be met by continued collective funding by grain growers through the Grains Research and 
Development Corporation (GRDC). Joint ventures involving collective funding by plant 
breeding companies are another possible source of compensating funding. A concrete 
example of the latter alternative is the formation of global consortia of private and public 
plant breeding organisations to develop molecular marker technology. Alternatively, an 
increasing proportion may need to come from individual private providers.  
For each of the above alternatives, it is likely that continued funding will be forthcoming only 
if commercial returns from “private” provision are sufficiently attractive to maintain ongoing 
investment. This will depend on the extent to which market forces and intellectual property 
rights enable providers to capture at least part of the value created from enabling technologies.  
Irrespective of the funding source for the investment, there will be concern about the efficient 
utilisation of these enabling technologies so long as there is a lack of competition in their 
provision. In particular, there will be concerns that charging for use of enabling technology in 
order to recoup the investment costs incurred to produce them will result in inefficient under 
utilisation. 
There are obvious parallels here to National Competition Policy (NCP) principles governing 
access to essential infrastructure. The aim of National Competition Policy (NCP) is to 
facilitate effective competition where competition between suppliers of goods and services 
result in lower prices, a wider range of products, and/or better service for consumers, but also 
to accommodate situations where competition does not have that effect, or where it conflicts 
with social objectives.    7 
In industries such as telecommunications, air and rail transport, and electricity transmission, it 
is recognised in NCP that competition may not be feasible or desirable in the provision of 
some essential infrastructure, and that the shared use of such ‘bottleneck’ or ‘essential’ 
infrastructure facilities may be necessary to facilitate efficient competition in downstream 
markets that use such infrastructure. Access regulation that aims to promote competition in 
markets that use the services of ‘essential’ infrastructure while preserving incentives to 
develop and maintain those facilities have been developed to address concerns about denial of 
access and/or monopoly pricing of access. 
Hence a case can be made that as plant breeding becomes increasingly privatised, equivalent 
access regimes will need to be developed for those enabling technologies that effectively are 
essential plant breeding infrastructure (EPBI). Unless some rational access regime is 
established, much of the potential benefits from scientific discoveries underpinning modern 
plant breeding may not be fully realised. In common with NCP access regimes, the aim 
should be to promote full and efficient competition between plant breeders, while preserving 
adequate incentives for investment in the ongoing development, maintenance, and provision 
of essential plant breeding infrastructure.  
There is provision in Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 for a third party to gain access 
to an eligible infrastructure service by having a service declared. However, such provisions 
are unlikely to be needed for plant breeding for the Australian grains industry. GRDC, as the 
key provider of EPBI, is cognisant of the problem, and likely to develop an undertaking as 
provided for in the TPA that specifies terms and conditions for access by all plant breeders.  
In such an undertaking, two key issues will be the grounds (if any) for denial of access, and 
pricing policy. There are at least two possible cases where denial of access, or discriminatory 
pricing, may be contemplated.  
One would be to deny access to, or charge higher prices for EPBI to large multi-national “life 
science” firms. A possible ground for doing so would be that these multi-national firms have 
access to other sources of EPBI from which Australian plant breeding firms are excluded, and 
therefore would have an unfair competitive advantage if they also had access to GRDC 
funded essential plant breeding infrastructure. Whether this would be in the interests of 
Australia, the grains industry at large, and/or growers is moot, and deserves further 
investigation.   
Another possible ground would be that GRDC has, and plans to continue to invest in selected 
new and Australian owned plant breeding firms. Fears have been expressed that they may 
decide to “protect” such investments by limiting other plant breeders access to GRDC funded 
EPBI. Prima facie, denying access or discriminatory pricing for this reason would seem to be 
an example of exploiting market power in order to benefit owned or related entities in 
upstream or downstream markets, and so contrary to NCP principles. Specifically, it would 
inhibit rigorous competition in the downstream plant breeding market. Nevertheless there may 
be grounds based on the potential impact on Australia’s trading position for treating plant 
breeding firms owned by overseas interests differently to domestically owned firms.  
6.  Monopoly Provision of Enabling Technologies given Uniform Pricing   
In the remainder of this paper, such concerns will be put aside in order to investigate 
monopoly provision of EPBI when the producer is obliged to provide access to all plant 
breeders at a uniform price. This scenario involves some fascinating pricing policy issues 
that deserve study even if essential plant breeding infrastructure funded by Australian grain 
growers is made available at non-commercial prices to all plant breeders.    8 
As is well known, goods that are both non-rival in use and non-price excludable are known as 
public goods. It has been argued above that while essential plant breeding infrastructure is 
non-rival in use, it can be price excludable. Such goods are variously referred to in the 
literature as joint goods, club goods, price excludable public goods, or simply excludable 
public goods.  
Molecular markers for a valuable polygenic trait are a good example of essential plant 
breeding infrastructure that is an excludable public good. They are one of the key inputs for 
more productive plant breeding; and prima facie, are non-rival in use by plant breeders
5. Thus 
production by more than one producer would involve wasteful duplication, and monopoly 
provision is likely to be economically efficient.  
At the same time, intellectual property created by the invention of new molecular markers can 
be protected as a trade secret, or by seeking patent rights. Hence, even though there are 
instances where they are made freely available, at least partial price excludability is feasible. 
Limits on the capacity for price exclusion are likely to depend on the costs of imitation by 
competitors, the costs of detection of imitation, and once detected, the costs of enforcing 
property rights against imitators. Consequently they provide a tangible and comprehensible 
case study with which to explore the likely consequences of adopting an access regime based 
on non-discriminatory pricing.  
Clearly there will be an imbalance in market power between a monopoly provider of 
molecular marker technology and third-party plant breeders seeking access, so the potential 
exists for excessive pricing that would be detrimental to Australian grain growers in 
international markets. On the other hand, if the eventual aim is to provide a basis for 
privatisation of production of molecular markers, the uniform price charged will need to be 
high enough to maintain the incentive for ongoing provision of the optimal level of this EPBI.  
In an ideal world, a monopoly provider could maximise revenue by practicing first degree 
price discrimination, and appropriating all of the benefits generated by essential plant 
breeding infrastructure. Specifically, each user would be charged their individual marginal 
willingness to pay for each molecular marker. While such an outcome might be regarded as 
inequitable, it would be efficient for at least the autarky case. In practice, the extent to which 
perfect price discrimination can be practised will be constrained by imperfect knowledge, 
transaction costs, and arbitrage opportunities for users or third parties. Furthermore, the 
application of competition policy principles is likely to require a monopoly provider of 
essential plant breeding infrastructure to charge the same price to all potential users.  
                                                 
5 Produced output from molecular marker programs can include disembodied knowledge about, inter alia, how 
to produce relevant primers for individual markers, estimates of genetic distance between breeding lines that 
might be used as parents for breeding hybrids, and QTL maps to assist in selecting for polygenic traits of 
interest. Use of these produced units of knowledge by one plant breeder does not prevent use by any number of 
other plant breeders.    9 
In the remainder of this paper, it will be assumed that a monopoly supplier must comply with 
a uniform pricing strategy that requires all potential customers to be charged the same price 
for each and every molecular marker produced. Given this constraint, in order to maximise 
profits, a monopoly provider will need to at least: 
  i) minimise costs of production, and  
  ii) appropriate as much of the potential aggregate net benefit as possible. Even if 
complete price excludability is feasible and costless, maximising the appropriation of benefits 
will involve: 
  a) selecting what is known as the Optimal Uniform Price (OUP), defined as  
       the uniform price that maximises revenue at each level of production, and  
  b) choosing the optimal level of output to produce given the marginal  
       revenue function associated with OUP.  
Relying on market processes to determine the price can not be expected to produce the desired 
outcome. In fact, from the literature on excludable public goods, it is clear that providers of 
such goods have considerable latitude in setting prices, including uniform prices.  
Some of the consequences of various pricing strategies used by a monopoly provider of 
excludable public goods have been analysed, inter alia, by Brennan and Walsh (1981,1985), 
and Burns and Walsh (1981). The remainder of this paper draws on some of their results. A 
key finding was that, in contrast to markets for private goods, the frequency distribution of 
individual demand functions is of critical importance in determining returns to producers of 
joint goods. Consequently, the firms’ pricing practice needs to take into account when 
analysing the supply of joint goods.  
To quote Burns and Walsh (1981, pp 168-169):  
“for  monopoly  production  of  price-excludable  public  goods,  information  on 
aggregate demand is inadequate even under uniform per-unit pricing. Since each 
production unit can be fully and equally consumed by all individuals, output need 
never exceed that required to satisfy the highest demand individual at any price. 
Moreover,  the  per-unit  price  faced  by  each  individual  can  be  less  than  the 
marginal production cost since many units are jointly consumed, but this would 
necessitate the rationing of some high-demand individuals by output rather than 
by price. Consequently, not only does the conventional aggregate demand curve 
not define the relationship between price and output for joint goods, in general it 
need not even define the relationship between price and aggregate consumption. 
Operationally, ….. the producer of a joint good will be concerned to identify the 
maximum  revenue  obtainable  from  (various)  given  output  levels,  and  this 
critically  depends  on  the  composition  of  demand.  Specifically,  he  will  be 
interested in the number of individuals who would purchase (at least) a certain 
quantity when confronted with a particular (revenue maximising) price, since this 
determines his marginal revenue. …….. This construct we term the “distribution 
of demand”, or, more succinctly, the demand distribution.”    10 
For any given plant breeder, the “value in use” of each molecular marker will be different 
because the genetic distance between the loci of each marker and the genes of interest are 
different. Consequently for each breeder the net
6 marginal user benefit (NMUB) will be a 
declining function of the number of molecular markers used. Furthermore, the willingness to 
pay for any particular marker is likely to differ between breeders because of differences in 
market size, expertise of the plant breeder in marker technology, etc...  
Figure 1 below illustrates the demand distribution for a hypothetical case where three plant 
breeding firms are the only potential customers for seven molecular markers that could be 
used to select for a valuable polygenic trait. The horizontal axis measures the number of 
selectable molecular markers produced by the sole supplier, as well as the number used by 
each plant breeder, while the vertical axis measures marginal user benefit, both individually 
and in aggregate.  
The demand functions for each of the three plant breeding firms
 7 are depicted as a set of 
separate linear demand curves D1, D2, and D3, which represent the net marginal user benefit 
(NMUB) for each individual plant breeder for each of the seven molecular markers. It is 
assumed that knowledge about these molecular markers, once produced, can be disseminated 
among potential users and utilized by them at zero net marginal social cost. Hence the 
potential combined marginal user benefit potentially available from full utilization of each 
molecular marker produced is obtained by vertically summing the individual demand curves 
for all users. This curve is denoted the potential aggregate marginal benefit (PAMB) function 
because it assumes that there will be full utilisation of produced output.  
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6  The direct variable costs of using molecular markers in a plant breeding program are significant, and need to 
be subtracted from the benefits of doing so to arrive at the net marginal user benefit from the essential plant 
breeding infrastructure knowledge that is non-rival in use. 
7   These functions are defined to measure marginal willingness to pay for each unit of knowledge given 
that the net marginal cost of utilisation is zero.    11 
For simplicity, assume constant marginal costs of producing molecular marker knowledge, as 
denoted by the horizontal line MC. As illustrated in Figure 1, it is socially optimal to produce 
four molecular markers. If these four molecular markers are produced and made available 
without cost to all plant breeders by some undefined but costless mechanism, potential 
aggregate net benefit will be equal to the shaded area below the potential aggregate marginal 
benefit (PAMB) curve and above the marginal cost of production. This area depicts the 
maximum potential net social surplus achievable given full utilisation of the optimal level of 
four molecular markers. This idealized set of circumstances will be used below as a 
benchmark against which to assess the impact of an access regime involving a mandated 
pricing strategy based on competition policy principles, to private provision of essential plant 
breeding infrastructure.  
Note that in the case illustrated in Figure 1, even if the enabling marker technology is 
provided free, plant breeder 1 will only use three molecular markers because the direct cost of 
using the 4
th available marker would exceed the gross benefit of doing so. On the other hand, 
use by breeders 2 and 3 will be constrained by availability of produced markers as the NMUB 
of the 4
th molecular marker is greater than zero. Hence full utilisation does not necessarily 
involve all breeders using all available markers.  
In general, there will be incomplete utilization of produced output when plant breeders are 
charged a uniform price to obtain access to molecular markers. Hence the PAMB function 
will overestimate realized aggregate marginal benefit (RAMB), which is defined as the sum 
of marginal benefits from actual utilisation. Recall that actual use may be rationed either by 
price or by availability when a uniform price is charged for access to molecular markers.  
Given a uniform price, and given that a sub-optimal number of molecular markers are 
produced; the aggregate net benefit that can be appropriated from plant breeder 2 is illustrated 
in Figure 2. Realised benefit is the area under the individual demand curve for plant breeder 2 
up to the amount of molecular markers actually used at the uniform price. Due to being 
obliged to charge a uniform price for all units of output, the monopoly provider will only be 
able to appropriate part of this area. Specifically revenue will equal the product of uniform 
price by amount of molecular markers used
8 , leaving the area labelled “User Benefit” as a net 
benefit for plant breeder 2.  
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8  The area labelled “Appropriated Revenue – from PB2”,   12 
Note that plant breeder 2 will underutilise molecular markers so long as price rationing results 
in actual utilisation being less than produced molecular markers. In Figure 2, this loss is 
depicted by the area labelled “PB2 Loss due to Under-utilisation”. Furthermore, to the extent 
that plant breeder 2 would have used more molecular markers than the produced amount if 
they were freely available, there will be a loss of potential welfare due solely to “under-
production”. Such a loss, which is depicted in Figure 2 by the area labelled “PB2 Loss due to 
Under-production”, is part of the social deadweight loss of privatising molecular marker 
production, even though it is not a loss of potentially appropriable benefits. 
As drawn in Figure 2, the maximum willingness-to-pay by plant breeder 1
9 just equals the 
uniform price. Consequently, PB1 is totally excluded by price from using any molecular 
markers, and the monopolist will earn no revenue from this plant breeder. Conversely, plant 
breeder 3 will be rationed solely by availability, and will use all produced molecular markers, 
so revenue will equal the product of total produced quantity by the uniform price. Total 
revenue from uniform pricing is obtained by summing over the realised benefit appropriated 
from all plant breeders.  
The magnitude of each area identified above will not only be different for each plant breeder, 
but will depend on both the quantum of molecular markers produced, and on the uniform 
price charged. Conditional on the latter two variables, aggregate revenue, user benefit not 
appropriated, and welfare losses due to under-utilisation and to under-production can be 
obtained by summing over the separate measures for all users. 
To proceed more formally with an analysis of the monopoly provision and pricing of a joint 
good like molecular markers, the same set of simplifying assumptions used by Burns and 
Walsh (1981) are adopted here. The starting point is the specification of the demand 
distribution, defined as “the number of individuals, n
10, who would each consume at least q 
units of output if the joint good was made available at a per-unit price of p.”  
Specifically, let the demand distribution be denoted as n=n(p,q); 
   where dn/dp<0; and dn/dq<0.: 
Alternatively the inverse function is p=p(n,q) which denotes maximum willingness to pay by 
user n for incremental unit of output q.  
The limits of this demand distribution can be specified by the parameters: N, P, and Q, 
defined as follows: 
  N denotes total number of potential users,   
  Q denotes quantity demanded at price zero by the most demanding user, and  
    also denotes maximum possible production.   
  P denotes maximum willingness-to-pay by the most demanding user,  
In order to ensure mathematical tractability, Burns and Walsh (1981) further assumed that the 
individual demand curves that make up this demand distribution are linear, and have identical 
slopes
11. Lastly it is assumed that:   
- n is uniformly distributed on the interval U(0,…..N)
12. and  
Given these assumptions: 
                                                 
9  i.e. the intersection of the demand curve for PB! With the vertical axis. 
10 See Burns and Walsh (1981, p.169). Note that the variable, n, refers only to the number of users who would 
consume all of the available amount of the joint good, and does not include those users who would consume 
only part of q at the defined price, p. 
11  Note that this assumption ensures that individual demand curves in the demand distribution do not intersect.  
Eliminating the possibility of intersecting individual demand curves makes the analysis much more tractable.  
12 Note that this is equivalent to assuming that maximum willingness-to-pay by the n the user, p(n) , is uniformly 
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Derivation of potential aggregate marginal benefits, PAMB(q) for produced output q, is 
straightforward, and yields:  
￿
  PAMB(q) =￿
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q.N/Q
p(n,q)dn
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Optimal production of molecular markers in an ideal world, q_OPT, is obtained by solving for 
q when PAMB(q) is equal to the marginal cost of production, 
￿ .  
  q_OPT = { ( ) }Q P N . . / . 2 1 m -             (3) 
 
By defining a production cost index, 
￿  = 
￿ /(P*N), and substituting this variable into equation 
and (3) dividing it by Q, a normalised equation can be obtained as follows:  
  q_OPT/Q = { ( ) } y . 2 1-               (4) 
As proposed above, this ideal of output can be used as a benchmark against which to compare 
the monopoly provision of essential plant breeding infrastructure when the monopolist is 
constrained to charge a uniform price for all produced output. 
To derive the total revenue, TR(qa,pu), that the monopolist can appropriate when potential 
users are charged a per unit uniform price pu, to access any number of molecular markers up 
to a limit of the amount produced, qa, note that: 
When available output equals qa, and uniform price equals pu,  
Users for whom p(n,0) < pu are totally excluded by price, so the monopolist derives no 
revenue from this group of potential users. 
For N.(pu/P) < n < N.(pu/P+qa/Q), appropriated  revenue equals pu.Q.(n/N-pu/P), and  
For  n > N.(pu/P+qa/Q), appropriated  revenue equals pu.Q, so total appropriated  revenue is 
given by:  
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Simplifying (5) yields:  




















1             (6)  
For any given level of production qa, the optimal uniform price, p_OUP(qa), is defined as the 
uniform price that maximises revenue for that level of output. Setting the derivative of (6) 
with respect to pu equal to zero, and solving for OUP(qa) yields : 
  OUP(qa) =    
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Substituting OUP(qa) from  (7) back into (6) for pu yields total revenue for qa given optimal 
uniform pricing TR_OUP (qa):    14 
  TR_OUP (qa)  =   
2
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And the equivalent marginal revenue function, MR_OUP (qa), for a profit maximising 
monopolist is:  
  MR_OUP (qa)  =   
2
          
2
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which is equal to:  
  MR_OUP (qa) 
2 16
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The impact of privatizing the production of essential plant breeding infrastructure, such as 
molecular markers, on the produced level of output can be assessed by setting the above 
function equal to marginal cost, 
￿ , and solving for profit maximising output, q_OUP(
￿ ):  
  q_OUP(
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Again this equation can be normalised by substituting 
￿  for 
￿ /(P*N), and dividing by Q, as 
follows:  
  q_OUP(
￿ )/Q =   ( ) ( ) 1 12 2
3
2
+ × - y               (12) 
and the ratio of q_OUP(
￿ ) to q_OPT is:  
  q_OUP(
￿ )/q_OPT =   ( ) ( )
( ) 1 2 3
2 1 12 2
- × ×
- + × ×
y
y
            (13) 
Note that equations (4), (12), and (13) all depend solely on the production cost index,  
(
￿  = 
￿ /(P*N)), defined as the ratio of the marginal cost of production to the product of two of 
the three parameters of the demand distribution, N and P. In Figure 3 below, the normalised 
equations (4) and (12) for optimal output in an ideal world, q_OPT/Q,  and provision by a 
profit maximising monopolist constrained to charging a uniform price, q_OUP(
￿ )/Q, 
respectively, as well as the ratio of the latter to the former, are plotted against the production 
cost index, 
￿  = 
￿ /(P*Q) to illustrate the impact of privatization on production of essential 
plant breeding infrastructure:  
   15 
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Several points from this Figure are noteworthy. Optimal level of output for molecular markers 
in an ideal world declines monotonically from Q, which is the quantity demanded at price 
zero by the most demanding user, and one of the limits of the demand distribution, to zero as 
the production cost index increases from 0 to 50%.  
However, even when the production cost index is zero, the profit maximising level of output 
for a monopolist constrained to charging a single uniform price for each and every level of 
output, will be only 67 percent of Q, the limit of the demand distribution. Moreover, it 
monotonically declines to zero by the time that the production cost index reaches 25%, which 
is half the value of the production cost index at which it is no longer optimal to produce any 
level of molecular markers.  
Furthermore, the ratio of molecular marker provision by monopolist charging a uniform price 
to optimal output in an ideal world never exceeds 75% even when the marginal cost of 
production is relatively inexpensive, and it declines rapidly to 0% by the time that the 
production cost index reaches 25%. In other words, the degree of under production of 
essential plant breeding infrastructure caused by privatisation becomes more severe as 
production costs become relatively more expensive. 
7.  Conclusions  
Much of the previous productivity gains from plant breeding derive from scientific 
discoveries that have underpinned enabling technologies for plant breeding. Just two 
examples are pre-breeding research in such diverse fields as biometry and plant pathology. 
Once produced, most of these enabling technologies are non-rival in use by plant breeders, 
and consequently can be thought of as essential plant breeding infrastructure (EPBI). 
Traditionally, such inputs were non-proprietary, provision was publicly funded, and access by 
public plant breeding programs was both open and free of any charges. As a result, there was 
no financial impediment to full utilisation of EPBI.     16 
As plant breeding becomes increasingly privatised, future potential productivity gains will 
depend on overcoming emerging threats to the provision of adequate levels of modern EPBI, 
such as molecular markers, and on the development of institutional arrangements that ensure, 
if not full utilisation, then at least levels of utilisation that minimise the loss of potential 
benefits in downstream markets. In a world where the supply of essential plant breeding 
infrastructure is being left more and more to commercially driven entities, these two issues of 
adequate provision, and open access will be interconnected by permitted pricing practices. 
Because competitive supply would involve wasteful duplication in production of such joint 
goods, pricing of EPBI by a monopoly provider will be a particularly important policy issue 
to be addressed if the potential benefits from modern plant breeding are to be fully realised. 
In common with NCP access regulation, at least part of the aim should be to promote full and 
efficient competition in upstream and downstream markets, while preserving adequate 
incentives for investment in the ongoing development, maintenance, and provision of 
essential plant breeding infrastructure. Some lessons can be learnt from the application of 
provisions in Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 to overcome denial of access to a third 
party to an eligible infrastructure service.  
However, even if denial of access does not prove to be a problem, an essential issue for any 
access regime will be to determine the impact of pricing practice by a monopoly provider of 
EPBI on potential losses from under-production due to inadequate incentives for future 
investment on the one hand, and the opportunity cost of under-utilisation of produced EPBI 
by plant breeders on the other hand. 
A start has been made on this task in this paper by utilising the framework for analysis of 
pricing of excludable public goods developed, inter alia, by Burns and Walsh (1981). 
Specifically, the impact on level of production of EPBI was analysed when a monopoly 
provider is constrained by competition policy to charging a single uniform price to all plant 
breeders for each and every molecular marker produced. 
As would be expected, it was demonstrated the monopoly provision would fall far short of 
theoretical output by a publicly financed and well informed public provider acting to 
maximise aggregate potentia benefits to industry and to society. It also was possible to 
quantify the possible degree of under-production. For molecular markers that are low cost 
relative to the parameters of the demand distribution, under-production might be as little as 
25%. However, past some very low level of the production cost index, the degree of under-
production increased dramatically. Moreover, even though it would be socially desirable to 
produce some EPBI for values of the production cost index up to 50%, a monopoly provider 
would not produce any essential plant breeding infrastructure if the production cost index 
exceeded 25%.  
Many questions require further research, including the following.  
What is the actual nature of plant breeders’ demand distribution for molecular markers, or 
other essential plant breeding infrastructure? 
How sensitive are the above results to the key assumptions that individual demand curves are 
linear, have the same slope, and are uniformly distributed across the demand distribution 
range, and that the marginal cost of production is constant?.  
What would be the effect on level of production of essential plant breeding infrastructure if 
differing pricing strategies were employed, such as:  
·  molecular markers provided to plant breeders on a cost recovery basis, or  
·  the access regime regulates prices so that monopoly profits do not exceed normal profits, 
or  
·  the monopolist must charge a uniform price for any given molecular marker, but can 
charge different uniform prices for different molecular markers,    17 
·  all feasible forms of price discrimination are permitted?  
Finally, apart from the impact of different pricing strategies on level of provision of essential 
plant breeding infrastructure, the magnitude of the loss of potential benefits due to under-
production and to under-utilisation also need to be estimated. 
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